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In Study 1, 167 English children aged 6 – 8 or 9 – 11 evaluated peer English or French soccer fans that were loyal or
partially disloyal. In Study 2, 149 children aged 5 – 11made judgments about generic inclusion norms between and
within competitive groups. In both studies, children’s understanding of intergroup inclusion/exclusion norms
(group nous) was predicted by theory of social mind (a social perspective taking measure) but not multiple
classification skill. In Study 2, the number of groups children belonged to (an index of peer group experience) also
predicted group nous. Supporting the developmental subjective group dynamics model (D. Abrams, A. Rutland,
& L. Cameron, 2003), children’s experience and perspective taking help themmake sense of inter- and intragroup
inclusion and exclusion.
Exclusion from social groups is prevalent in many
peer relationships and groups throughout life
(Abrams & Christian, 2007). Developmental psychol-
ogists have studied peer exclusion extensively (cf.
Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993) and shown it to
be associated with depression, psychological malad-
justment, poor academic achievement, violence, and
dropping out of school (Graham & Juvonen, 1998;
Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998). Moreover, much of
this research has focused on how a child’s individual
social deficits can lead them to reject peers (Killen,
Rutland, & Jampol, in press) such as the extent to
which bullies are dispositionally aggressive or lack
sensitivity to social cues (Crick & Dodge, 1994;
Hawker & Boulton, 2000). We propose a different,
and complementary, way to investigate exclusion by
considering how children may be excluded by, or
engage in exclusion of, peers for reasons other than
cognitive or personality characteristics. We consider
that children sometimes exclude peers as a means of
asserting their group membership, in intergroup con-
texts—that is, in situationswhen an in-group and out-
group are being compared (see Abrams, Hogg, &
Marques, 2005). In these situations, ‘‘effective’’ bully-
ing or victimization may conceivably be a strategy
used by children with high levels of social compe-
tence such as an understanding of others’ social
perspectives (Dunn, 2004; Emler & Reicher, 1995;
Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999).
Research has shown that children may exclude
peers simply because they belong to a different group
or social category (see Aboud, 1988; Bigler, Jones, &
Lobliner, 1997; Nesdale, 2004). This form of exclusion
(i.e., intergroup bias) develops because group mem-
berships become an integral part of children’s self-
concepts. Developmental research is consistent with
social identity theory’s prediction (Tajfel & Turner,
1979) that people are motivated to reinforce their
social identity by showing relatively greater favor-
ability toward their in-groups (Nesdale, 2004;
Verkuyten, 2001). Moreover, older children are
also sensitive to self-presentational concerns when
judging in-groups and out-groups (Rutland, 2004;
Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005).
Social developmental psychologists have recently
started to examine children’s exclusion judgments of
members within in-groups and out-groups in inter-
group contexts (e.g., Abrams & Rutland, 2008;
Juvonen, Nishina, & Graham, 2001; Killen, Lee-Kim,
McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002). In particular, research
that builds on a model of the development of ‘‘sub-
jective group dynamics’’ (DSGD; Abrams & Rutland,
2008; Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003) has inves-
tigated how group identity can motivate children to
exclude some but not others within the same groups.
In the present article, we propose that the more
accomplished excluders, and perhaps avoiders of
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exclusion, may be those who have more ‘‘nous,’’ or
implicit know-how, about the way group and inter-
group relationships typically work (i.e., an under-
standing of the group dynamics involved in
exclusion within peer groups). We examine the
contention that the development of such ‘‘group
nous’’ may involve the ability to take the social
perspective of peers within an intergroup context.
We also explore whether group nous reflects the
extent of children’s experiences of formal and infor-
mal social groups, specifically the number of groups
they belong to.
One group norm that is particularly characteristic
of competitive situations is that members should be
loyal to their own group (Levine & Moreland, 2002;
VanVugt&Hart, 2004). Thus, if children are to sustain
their inclusion in peer groups, it is likely they will
need to gain an effective understanding about how
loyalty norms operate (cf. Castelli, de Amicis, & Sher-
man, 2007). Therefore, the two studies in this article
examine the relation among children’s understanding
of loyalty norms in competitive intergroup situations,
their cognitive and social-cognitive skills (specifically,
multiple classification and social perspective taking),
and the extent of their experience of belonging to
different groups with peers.
The DSGD Model
Research on the DSGDmodel examines children’s
evaluations of normative (e.g., conformist, rule-
following) and deviant (i.e., counternormative)
peers within groups. Studies have related these
evaluations to judgments and reasoning about inclu-
sion and exclusion of peers by members of in-group
and out-group schools (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron,
& Ferrell, 2007, Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, &
Marques, 2003; ), peers in competitive situations
involving members of minimal groups (Abrams,
Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008) and groups sup-
porting national soccer teams (Abrams, Rutland, &
Cameron, 2003).
The DSGD model contends that cognitive devel-
opment and social experiences enable children to
develop a more sophisticated understanding of how
peer groupmembers’ behavior impacts their own and
others’ social identity and thus to engage in system-
atic group-based inclusion or exclusion of particular
peers (Quintana, 1994; Ruble, Alvarez, Bachman, &
Cameron, 2004). A central tenet of the DSGDmodel is
that children who identify with their group should
also express favorable attitudes toward specific peers
(from both the in-group and the out-group) who
demonstrate comparatively stronger support for the
in-group. Specifically, as subjective understanding of
group dynamics develops, children should begin to
evaluate peers not simply as in-group or out-group
members, and not simply as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ based
on an absolute judgmental criterion, but in terms of
the implications of peers’ behavior for the relative
standing of their in-groups and out-groups. For
example, a disloyal in-group member may be judged
less favorably than a similarly disloyal out-group
member (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003). In
the DSGD model, exclusion of peers within groups
is studied by examining differential evaluation. This is
the favorable appraisal of specific individuals, from
either the in-group or the out-group, who provide
relativelygreater support for the in-group (seeAbrams&
Rutland, 2008, for details).
The DSGDmodel also focuses on children’s aware-
ness of differential inclusion. This is an important
element of the ‘‘subjective’’ aspect of the DSGD
model. It is assessed by asking children how other
group members would feel toward normative and
deviant peers from different social groups. Differen-
tial inclusion reflects children’s understanding that
in-group and out-groupmembers are likely to express
opposing evaluations of normative and deviant peers
within each group. For example, a normative (in the
present research, loyal) in-group peer should be liked
by other in-group members but may be disliked by
out-group members. Conversely, a deviant (in the
present research, disloyal) in-grouppeer is likely to be
derogated by in-groupmembers but not by out-group
members. A pressing unexplored question arising
frompreviousDSGD studies, is how childrendevelop
a subjective model of what to expect, and what is
expected, of peers in intergroup situations such as
competitions.
The DSGD model predicts there should be a posi-
tive relationship between differential evaluation and
differential inclusion, a connection that can be labeled
inclusion-related judgment. Specifically, children’s
differential evaluations of peers should tend to be in
line with their perceptions of differential inclusion;
that is, they should favor peers they believe will be
evaluated highly by other in-group members rather
than out-group members. This is an important point
because it requires children to attune their own
evaluation of a peer not only to the overall social
desirability of that peer’s actions but to thedifferences
in evaluations they believe will be made by in-group
versus out-group members.
On the basis that as they get older children should
gain greater understanding of group dynamics, and
specifically group loyalty norms, the DSGD model
contends that the differential evaluation –differential
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inclusion relationship (inclusion-related judgment),
should be stronger among older than younger chil-
dren (the DSGD hypothesis). This is qualified by
amotivational hypothesis that inclusion-related judg-
ment will be most pronounced among older children
who identify and show more intergroup bias. This is
because they are motivated to use differential inclu-
sion judgments more systematically as a guide for
their differential evaluations of peer group members.
This hypothesis was supported in Abrams, Rutland,
andCameron’s (2003) study of 5- to 11-year-old English
children’s judgments of loyal and disloyal supporters
of an in-group (England) or out-group (Germany)
soccer team in the context of the 2002 World Cup
Soccer championships (see also Abrams et al., 2008).
The key theoretical prediction of the motivational
hypothesis is that when excluding peers, older chil-
dren will be more likely to make use of their under-
standing of differential inclusion if they are more
motivated to support their in-group.
Other evidence suggests that children are sensitive
to potential status differences between groups
(Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) and threats and challenges
from out-groupmembers (Nesdale,Maass, Durkin, &
Griffiths, 2005). In addition, sensitivity to group
norms is illustrated by research on the effects of
accountability. Research with adults shows that peer
accountability increases the derogation of in-group
deviants relative to out-group deviants (Marques,
Abrams, Paez, &Martinez-Taboada, 1998). The emer-
gence of this accountability effect during childhood
parallels the development of inclusion-related judg-
ment, as shown by Abrams et al. (2007). This is
consistent with the idea that the DSGD involves an
increase in sensitivity to differences in in-group and
out-group norms. Thus, the question for the present
research is whether we can identify particular devel-
opmental variables that do (and do not) relate consis-
tently to children’s subjective group dynamics.
Social Perspective Taking, Classification Skill,
and Attributions
Undoubtedly, motivational and normative varia-
bles are important in the development of children’s
intergroup attitudes and exclusion judgments of
peers within groups (Bennett & Sani, 2004; Nesdale
et al., 2005; Ojala & Nesdale, 2004; Rutland, 2004). We
contend that social cognition also contributes to the
DSGD (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). Study 1 extends
previous research by investigating how social per-
spective taking, multiple classification skill, and attri-
butions related to children’s differential inclusion
judgments. As described earlier, intergroup situa-
tions, particularly competition, are likely to invoke
a norm that members should be loyal to their groups
(Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). We suggest that ‘‘group
nous’’—know-how about group processes such as
loyalty, conformity pressure, and groups showing in-
group biases—is in part likely to reflect children’s
competence in understanding multiple perspectives
in social relationships (cf. Dunn, 2004; Hymel,
Vaillancourt, McDougall, & Renshaw, 2002; Ruble
et al., 2004). Abrams, Rutland, and Cameron (2003;
Abrams et al., 2005; Abrams & Rutland, 2008) pro-
posed that two types of skill might facilitate under-
standing of multiple perspectives. Specifically, social
perspective taking and multiple classification skill
could both plausibly contribute to children’s expect-
ations of differential inclusion. The potentially dis-
tinctive role of these social-cognitive skills has not
been examined previously.
Social Perspective Taking
Social perspective taking is important in the devel-
opment of social understanding, including emotion
understanding (Selman, 1971), awareness about eth-
nicity (Quintana, 1999), and discrimination (Spears
Brown & Bigler, 2004). Perspective taking is some-
times investigated by assessing children’s second-
order mental state understanding (e.g., Sullivan,
Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). By 4 years of age,
most children have developed a basic ‘‘theory of
mind’’ that enables them to solve a first-order false-
belief task. Then at the age of 6, children also pass
second-order false-belief tasks involving an object in
thephysicalworld (Perner&Wimmer, 1985;Wimmer&
Perner, 1983). However, the development of ‘‘mind-
reading’’ continues well into middle childhood
(Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted,
1999). After 6 years of age, children begin to show
understanding in false-belief tasks that employ more
social situations that involve location of a person
(Symons, McLaughlin, Moore, & Morine, 1997) or
activities preferred by a friend (Nguyen & Frye, 1999)
or mistaken emotions (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, An-
drews, & Cooke, 1989).
Beyond 7 – 8 years, children continue to showmore
advanced theory of mind abilities (Banerjee, 2000;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Children develop amotiva-
tional orientation toward what various individuals
think and feel, demonstrating sensitivity to the mul-
tiple links between thoughts, feelings, and behavior
within social interactions. For example, children
between 7 and 11 years develop the ability to recog-
nize and explain a faux pas (e.g., an unintended insult;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), aswell as an understanding
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of modesty and the social advantages of self-depre-
cating presentation of the self (Banerjee, 2000;Watling
& Banerjee, 2007). Therefore, within this age range,
children are likely develop an understanding of social
perspectives and emotions that arise in social relation-
ships. In particular, they should be able to distinguish
their own feelings about a character from the feelings
of a peer who does not share the same information
about that character. This requires an ability to use
information about the prior social relationship
between two peers to make an inference about their
feelings toward one another, independently of the
child’s own knowledge and feelings about that peer.
Faux pas tasks measure expectations about embar-
rassment, but our present concern was more with
children’s inferences about liking and hence we
devised a task to closer to a false-belief task but that
would focus on liking. We label this form of social
perspective taking theory of social mind (ToSM) to
highlight the social evaluative inferences involved.
To distinguish the potential role of ToSM frommere
learningabout theparticularnorms for a specific group,
the present research used a ToSM task in the interper-
sonal domain, the content and context of which was
completely unrelated to the competitive intergroup
relationship or the peers children had previously been
asked to judge.Wehypothesize thatToSMshould relate
to understanding about differential inclusion because
differential inclusion involves an appreciation that
members of different groupswill have different relation-
ship with, and hence feelings toward, the same peer
(cf. Quintana, 1994, 1999; Ruble et al., 2004).
In contrast, ToSM ability should be unrelated to
whether or not a child engages in differential evalua-
tion. Specifically, whether a child favors a particular
group member will sometimes accord with, and some-
times oppose, the child’s view of howpeers feel toward
that groupmember, depending onwhether the peers in
question are in-group or out-group members and on
how strongly the child is motivated to support the
in-group. In summary, the ToSM hypothesis is that ToSM
should be positively related to expectations of differen-
tial inclusion but unrelated to differential evaluation.
Multiple Classification Skill
Multiple classification skill is potentially responsi-
ble for age-related reductions in intergroup prejudice
(e.g., Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1992, 2007). The
ability to classify people along multiple dimensions
simultaneously (Inhelder & Piaget, 1964) should
enable children to attend to the individual character-
istics of each person rather than perceiving all
members within a social category as being the same.
However, the evidence relating to intergroup bias is
mixed (Aboud, 2005; Bigler et al., 1997; Cameron,
Rutland, & Brown, 2007).
Spears Brown and Bigler (2004) proposed that, ‘‘one
cognitive skill that may relate to the perception of
discrimination is the ability to simultaneously classify
people alongmultiple dimensions . . . between the ages
of 5 and 10 . . . children acquire the cognitive skills
hypothesized to be associated with adult-like percep-
tions of discrimination’’ (p. 716). Two previous studies
examined the hypothesis that multiple classification
skill may contribute to children’s ability to distinguish
between social relationships at different levels (inter-
group and intragroup)when both levels are relevant to
evaluations of peers. Abrams et al. (2007) found no
relation between multiple classification skill and inter-
group bias when children judged peers of an in-group
summer school. However, Abrams et al. (2008) found,
in a minimal intergroup competition, multiple classifi-
cation skill was related to reduced intergroup bias but
not todifferential evaluationor inclusion.These studies
involved relatively novel groups, and it is conceivable
that the relations with multiple classification skill were
somehow suppressed for that reason. Therefore, the
present research takes a further opportunity to evaluate
the role of multiple classification in a competitive
context involving a real in-group and out-group com-
parable to that used byAbrams,Rutland, andCameron
(2003). Themultiple classification hypothesis is that better
multiple classification skill should be accompanied by
decreases in intergroup bias and larger differences in
evaluations of different peers.
Unlike previous research, Study 1 explores two
different interpretations of the above hypothesis. First,
if children with better multiple classification skill
adopt a more individuated form of judgment, they
should distinguishmore between normative and devi-
ant peers in absolute terms, regardless ofwhether these
are members of an in-group or an out-group. Alterna-
tively, if children with better multiple classification
skill are better able to integrate judgments at the two
levels of categorization (intergroup and intragroup),
they might show increased differential evaluation.
That is, they should be relatively more favorable to
peers that lean more toward the in-group prescriptive
norm. By examining both alternatives, we reduce the
possibility of falsely accepting a null hypothesis that
multiple classification skill is unrelated to differentia-
tion among members within groups.
Attributions
Study 1 provides a deeper analysis of children’s
reasoning about differential inclusion by investigating
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attributions. There is considerable developmental
research investigating children’s understanding and
reasoning surrounding social exclusion betweengroups.
For example, drawing on social domain theory (Sme-
tana, 1995; Turiel, 1998), developmental research on
children’s evaluations and justification of social exclu-
sion (Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002) shows that older
children use more social-conventional justifications for
social exclusion between groups such as ‘‘group func-
tioning’’ (i.e., ‘‘The group won’t work well with some-
onedifferent in’’). In addition, Spears BrownandBigler
(2004) have suggested that children’s increased under-
standing about social discrimination may be reflected
in more attributions at a group level about discrimina-
tory acts.Ourmeasure ofdifferential inclusion involves
understanding the role of the group, and group loyalty,
for predicting how peers social exclude one another
within groups in intergroup situations. Therefore, the
present research extends previous DSGD research by
measuring children’s freely made attributions about
differential inclusion to see whether these do indeed
refer to aspects of the group and loyalty/disloyalty of
peers, rather than to the personality traits of the
characters (cf. Abrams et al., 2005; Levine &Moreland,
2002; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001).
Study 1
Study 1 involves a similar intergroup context as
Abrams, Rutland, and Cameron (2003) but with
a different out-group. During the 2004 European
Championship Soccer Finals, the English and French
national teams were competing in the same section of
the tournament. To check that France was a salient
out-group, a pilot study asked ten 5- to 7-year-olds
and twelve 9- to 11-year-olds to evaluate English and
French children. In line with findings from the main
study, they rated the English (M 5 4.64, SD 5 0.79)
more positively than the French (M5 3.41, SD51.18),
F(1, 20) 5 15.86, p , .001.
In the main study, English children aged between 6
and 8 or between 9 and 11 years old evaluated English
and French soccer supporters and then judged a nor-
mative and deviant soccer fan from either group. The
normativepeerexpressednormative attitudesby favor-
ing only their own team. The attitudes of the deviant
peer were counternormative (i.e., disloyal) because
they evaluated both teams positively. The age ranges
were chosen both for comparability with previous
research (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques,
2003) and because evidence suggests that between
these ages, children develop the ability to attend to
use multiple classifications when judging group mem-
bers, engage in social perspective taking (Quintana,
1994, 1999), and develop advanced theory of mind
capabilities (Banerjee, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).
To test the DSGDmodel, we created three indices of
differentiation used in previous studies (e.g., Abrams,
Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams et al., 2007, 2008):
intergroupbias, differential evaluation, anddifferential
inclusion. Table 1 summarizes how these are com-
puted. New measures for the present research exam-
ined attributions for differential inclusion and ToSM.
Method
Design and Participants
The design involved two between-participants
variables. These were age category (6 – 8 years and
9 – 11 years) and group membership of target peer
group members (in-group vs. out-group). For ratings
of peer group members, the within-participants vari-
able was member (normative vs. eviant).
Participants included 86 females and 81 males
from two age groups: 6 – 8 years (n 5 86, M 5 87
months) and 9 – 11 years (n 5 81, M 5 119 months).
Most participantswere tested at their school (n5 116),
though some participants were attending a summer
school program (n 5 51). They were drawn from
a district within which 96.6% of the population is
classified as White British in the U.K. Census. The
locality is ranked 190th of 354 in the English Indices of
Multiple Deprivation. Compared with the national
average (51%), 68.3% of households were classified as
of medium to high socioeconomic status. Thus, the
children were predominantly from middle-class
backgrounds. They were tested individually by
a female experimenter. All participants had consent
from their parent or guardian to participate.
Procedure
Data were collected from June to August 2004, the
beginning of which included the 2004 European
Soccer Championship. The younger children were
interviewed one on one at a table by an experimenter.
The older children self-completed the questionnaire
individually in small groups while experimenters
assisted with any questions or concerns about the
questionnaire. Children were assigned to condition
randomly.
Materials
Following the same method of training and
introduction as Abrams, Rutland, and Cameron
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(2003), most questions were answered by placing
a check mark on a 5-point feeling face scale, which
presented faces with the mouth in a downward
position (1) through horizontal (3), to a large smile
position (5).
Intergroup bias. Intergroup bias was assessed by
asking, ‘‘How friendly do you think England/France
football team supporters are?’’ and ‘‘How clever do
you think England/France football team supporters
are?’’ Responses on the faces scale were scored from 1
(not at all) to 5 (very). The items tap two core dimen-
sions of adult stereotypes of most societal groups,
namely warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy,
Glick, & Xu, 2002). Fiske et al.’s (2002) research shows
that in-groups are generally regarded as more com-
petent and warmer than competing out-groups.
These dimensions also correspond to the widely used
‘‘status’’ and ‘‘solidarity’’ dimensions used in pre-
vious research with adults (e.g., Locke, 2003) and
younger children (e.g., Durbrow, Pena, Masten,
Sesma, & Williamson, 2001; Langlois & Styczynski,
1979), as well as previous developmental intergroup
research (e.g., Bigler et al., 1997).
Intragroup judgments. The next page described two
boys, Alex and Mark, who were either both English
and supporters of the England football team or both
French and supporters of the France football team. It
was explained, ‘‘They arebothEnglish/French, live in
England/France, and have supported the English/
French football team since they were children. Alex
and Mark go to all the England/France games and
watch them on TV. They are real fans of the England/
France football team. Alex and Mark were asked to
think about France playing England in Euro 2004.
Here are some of the things they said.’’
Statements given by the normative peer group
member (Alex) and deviant peer group member
(Mark) were then presented. The order of presenta-
tion of the two peers was counterbalanced. The
normative member showed complete own group
support. He said ‘‘I think [own group] is the best
team. Even if we lost the game with [other group] I’d
still say that [own group] are the better team.’’ The
deviant member showed support to both teams. He
said, ‘‘It’s great when [own group] play well, they’re
a fantastic team. But when [other group] play well I
will always clap and cheer for [other group].’’ (See
Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003, for details of
piloting of comparable items in the context of England
and Germany.)
Manipulation check items asked children, ‘‘How
does Alex/Mark feel about being an England
Table 1
Measures and Scoring
Measure Computation Scoring range and meaning
General intergroup bias Mean of ratings of in-group minus mean
of ratings of the out-group on ‘‘friendly’’ and
‘‘clever’’
4 5 out-group favoritism, +4 5 in-group
favoritism
Differential inclusion For each type of member: (a) rating of inclusion
in the member’s group minus rating of inclusion
in opposing group. Then (b) normative members’
score minus deviant members’ score
(a) (4 to +4) for each type of member and
(b) 8 5 normative members included most,
8 5 deviant members included most
(regardless of whether they belong to the
in-group or out-group)
Attributions for inclusion Group, loyalty, trait 0 5 no attribution, 1 5 attribution using this
feature
Differential evaluation In-group condition: Mean of 6 ratings of normative
member minus 6 ratings of deviant member.
Out-group condition: Mean of 6 ratings of deviant
member minus 6 ratings of normative member
4 5 favor undermining member +4 5 favor
validating member
Absolute differential evaluation Absolute difference in mean rating of normative
minus mean rating of deviant member
0 5 evaluate both members identically,
4 5 evaluate members maximally differently
Multiple classification Number of categories used without error 0 5 random or nonsystematic, 1 5 single
dimension (color or shape), 2 5 two
dimensions (color and shape)
Theory of social mind Understanding of false evaluation task 0 5 incorrect and unexplained, 1 5 correct but
limited explanation, 2 5 correct plus explanation
that character is unaware of member’s negative
actions
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supporter?’’ and ‘‘How do you think Alex/Mark
would feel about supporting the French football team
instead?’’ These measures had been used in previous
research to exclude children who did not understand
what the peer had said (Abrams, Rutland, & Ca-
meron, 2003).
Children were reminded of each peer’s statements
and then answered evaluative questions about one
then the other character (in the order they were
presented initially). These asked, children to choose
a feeling face to show, ‘‘How do you feel towards
Alex/Mark?’’ ‘‘How do you feel about what Alex/
Mark said?’’ ‘‘How much would you like to be
Alex’s/Mark’s friend?’’ ‘‘In a game, howmuchwould
you want Alex/Mark to be on your team?’’ ‘‘How
friendly do you think Alex/Mark is?’’ and ‘‘How
clever do you think Alex/Mark is?’’
Group inclusion questions asked, ‘‘How do you
think other people who support (same/opposite
team as character) would feel toward Alex/Mark?’’
These were answered using the faces scale. Each
question was followed by an open-ended attribution
question, ‘‘Why do you think they would feel that
way toward Alex/Mark?’’ Older children wrote
their responses on lines provided, whereas younger
participants responded verbally, and their re-
sponses were recorded by the experimenters. The
responses were later coded for different types of
explanation. After viewing the answers, three types
of attributions seemed prevalent: attribution to the
character’s traits (e.g., ‘‘because he is a nice per-
son’’), attribution to something about the charac-
ter’s group (e.g., ‘‘because it is a good team’’), and
attribution to loyalty/disloyalty (e.g., ‘‘because he
wasn’t as nice about his own side’’). It was possible
for children to make more than one attribution and
therefore for each member the occurrence of each of
these three types of attribution was coded sepa-
rately (1 5 present, 0 5 absent). The coding of these
responses had high interrater reliability (r 5 .83).
After answering these questions, children com-
pleted the multiple classification task and the ToSM
task. The procedure for the multiple classification
taskwas the same as that used byAbrams et al. (2007,
2008) and similar to that used by previous research-
ers (Bigler & Liben, 1992; Bigler et al., 1997). Children
were given a sheet of paper with three red Xs, three
green Xs, three red triangles, and three green trian-
gles in a mixed arrangement at the top of the page. A
large 2  2 matrix was displayed underneath these
colored shapes. Children were instructed, ‘‘Below
are 12 things. Think about which of these things
belong together. Using the red and green pens, draw
the things in the grid below. Put things that belong
together in the same square of the grid. You do not
have to use all the squares.’’ Responses were scored
0 if no categorization was used, 1 if a single dimen-
sion was used to sort the items, and 2 if the partici-
pant sorted the items using both dimensions (color
and shape). Measurement properties of this task are
considered further in Study 2.
The ToSM task required children to understand
a ‘‘false evaluation’’ of another character. The task has
a social focus, requiring understanding of how a first
character will feel toward a second character who has
secretly stolen the first character’s toys. To answer
correctly, children must dissociate their own evalua-
tion of the thief from that held by the first character.
This social situation provides a parallel context to the
social-cognitive demands children may face when
making social judgments about group behavior, such
as how others would feel about an in-group or out-
group member who supported or discredited the
in-group or out-group.
Children were told, ‘‘Jack and Chris have just met
for the first time. Jack is playing a game with Chris.
Jack is having fun and is enjoying playing the game
a lot. Then Jack leaves the room to get a drink. While
Jack is gone, Chris steals some of Jack’s toys. Jack
comes back after Chris has hidden the toys in his
pocket.’’ Children were then asked, ‘‘Do you think
Jack likes Chris?’’ and ‘‘Why/why not?’’ Children
who accurately take the social perspective of Jack
should state that Jack likes Chris because Jack did not
know about the theft.
Responses were scored according to both the
judgment of whether Jack would like Chris or not
and also whether the explanation indicated that the
child understood that Jack was unaware Chris had
stolen the toys. A score of 0 was assigned to incorrect
answers (no) including any with the explanation that
Jack would not like Chris because Chris stole/is
a thief. A score of 1 was assigned to partially correct
answers (yes) that gave limited explanation (e.g.,
‘‘because he plays with Chris’’). A score of 2 was
assigned to fully correct yes answers that included
an accurate explanation (e.g., ‘‘because he thinks
Chris is nice’’ or ‘‘because he doesn’t knowChris took
the toys’’).
Finally, children answered questions to indicate
their age, birthday, gender, and school.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Data from 11 childrenwere excluded because they
gave uniform responses (e.g., the end of the scale) for
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all items or because they failed the manipulation
check (i.e., inaccurately judged the deviant to be
more favorable to the deviant’s group than was the
normative member from that group). Data for the
remaining 156 children were used for subsequent
analyses. Random assignment to condition was
successful within both age levels (maximum differ-
ence between cell sizes in the in-group and out-group
condition5 3), v2(6)5 0.11, p5 .75. Forty-three of the
participants were tested before the France versus
England football match in the 2004 European Soccer
Championship, and the remainder after the match
(which England lost). There were no significant effects
of time of testing.
School and gender bias differences were evaluated
(cf. Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994). Neither
variable is directly relevant to the present hypotheses
or to the comparison between the soccer teams. There
were no significant multivariate main effects or
interactions involving either gender or school. Effects
of order of presentation of the normative and deviant
peer group members were also nonsignificant on all
measures, F, 2.1, p..10, so gender, school, and order
are not included in remaining analyses.
Differentiation Measures
Table 1 shows how composite variables were com-
puted. Table 2 provides the means for the judgments
of specific groups and individual members, showing
the effects of group and member. Separate analysis of
in-group and out-group judgments, relevant for the
analysis of prejudice (e.g., Aboud, 2005; Nesdale,
2004) is not germane for the present research. Details
of results at the level of individual variables are
available from the first author. Overall means and
correlations among the composite variables are pre-
sented in Table 3.
General intergroup bias. The two items evaluating
each groupwere averaged (Cronbach’s a. .7 for both
groups). Children favored England supporters (M 5
3.88, SD 5 0.96) significantly more than French
supporters (M 5 3.10, SD 5 1.10), F(1, 151) 5 65.02,
g2p 5 :301, p, .001. Intergroup bias was computed by
subtracting evaluation of the out-group from evalua-
tion of the in-group. Bias was significantly greater
than zero within both age categories (MYounger5 1.21,
SD 5 1.42; MOlder 5 0.43, SD 5 1.06) and decreased
with age, r 5 .28, p , .001.’’
Group inclusion. Following Abrams, Rutland, and
Cameron (2003), the measures of group inclusion for
the normative and deviant peer were reduced to
a single index of differential inclusion. The higher the
score, the more the child expects normative peers to
be accepted by the member’s group and rejected by
the opposing group, and the more the child expects
deviant peers to accepted by the opposing group but
rejected by the member’s group (see Table 1). Table 3
shows that differential inclusion increased signifi-
cantly with age, r 5 .27, p , .001. As predicted by
the DSGD model, 9- to 11-year-olds showed more
differential inclusion (M 5 1.51, SD 5 1.0) than 6- to
8-year-olds (M 5 0.86, SD 5 1.49).
Member evaluations. The six items used to evaluate
the normative member and the deviant member were
factor analyzed. This revealed just two distinct factors
with no cross loading items. These factors corre-
sponded to evaluations of normative and deviant
peer group members, accounting for 35% and 29.1%
of the variance, respectively. Responses to the six
items for each member were averaged to produce
measures of normative evaluation and deviant evalu-
ation (Cronbach’s as 5 .89 and .88, respectively).
A Group  Member analysis of variance on eval-
uations of members revealed a significant pattern of
differential evaluation, F(1, 151) 5 37.79, g2p 5 :20,
p , .001, (see also Table 2). To encapsulate this effect
at the level of individual participants, a measure of
differential evaluation was computed across levels of
group as well as member (see Table 1). The higher the
score, the more the child favors the member who is
relatively more validating of the in-group (e.g., an in-
group normative or an out-group deviant member).
Children in both age categories showed significant
levels of differential evaluation (p , .01) and differ-
ential evaluation decreased significantlywith age (see
Table 3; MYounger 5 0.87, SD 5 1.35; MOlder 5 0.45,
SD 5 1.40).’’
The Relations Among Components of Differentiation
Table 3 shows that the three differentiation meas-
ures are related to one another as predicted by the
DSGDmodel. Specifically, the data are consistentwith
the predicted pattern of intergroup – intragroup dif-
ferentiation (r 5 .34, p , .001) and inclusion-related
judgment (r 5 .34, p , .001), despite the fact that
differential inclusion and differential evaluationwere
related in opposite directions with age.
The motivational hypothesis predicts a three-way
interaction among age, intergroup bias, and differen-
tial inclusion on differential evaluation. To test this
hypothesis, procedures recommended by Aiken and
West (1991) were followed. We first centered age,
intergroup bias, and differential inclusion and com-
puted their two- and three-way interactions, which
were then entered hierarchically as predictors of
differential evaluation. There were significant main
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effects of age, b 5 .18, t 5 2.24, p , .05; intergroup
bias, b 5 .27, t 5 3.48, p , .001; and differential
inclusion,b5 .36, t5 4.68,p, .001,R25 .23,F(3, 141)5
14.47, p, .001. Therewas also a significant interaction
between intergroup bias and differential inclusion,
b 5 .34, t 5 2.81, p , .01. Consistent with the moti-
vational hypothesis, this was moderated by the
predicted three-way interaction with age, b 5 .34,
t 5 2.92, p , .01.
Figure 1 illustrates the simple Intergroup Bias 
Differential Inclusion interaction within each age
category. Among 6- to 8-year-olds, simple effects
analyses revealed only significant main effects of
intergroup bias, b 5 .24, t 5 2.45, p , .05, and
differential inclusion, b 5 .53, t 5 5.54, p , .001, but
not their interaction, b5.02, t5 0.18. As intergroup
bias and differential inclusion increased, so did dif-
ferential evaluation. Among 9- to 11-year-olds, there
was a significant simple main effect of intergroup
bias, b 5 .26, t 5 2.25, p , .05, and a significant
interaction between intergroup bias and differential
inclusion, b 5 .37, t 5 2.85, p , .01. Within that
interaction, consistent with the motivational hypoth-
esis, when intergroup bias was low, differential inclu-
sion was not significantly related to differential
evaluation, t 5 1.25, b 5 .15, p . .20, but when
intergroup bias was high, the relationship was highly
significant, t 5 3.00, b 5 .34, p , .005.
Social Cognition
ToSM and multiple classification skill. ToSM and
multiple classification skill are potential antecedents
of subjective group dynamics. Consistent with the
social perspective taking literature, ToSM perfor-
mance improved with age, r 5 .25, p , .01. ToSM
was unrelated to intergroup bias or differential eval-
uation but, as predicted by the ToSM hypothesis, it
was significantly related to differential inclusion,
r 5 .23, p , .01. In line with cognitive developmental
theory, multiple classification scores also increased
significantly with age, r 5 .38, p , .001. Also, in line
with the first expectation from the multiple classifi-
cation hypothesis, increased multiple classification
skill was accompanied by decreased general inter-
group bias, r 5 .26, p , .001.
Toexamine theprediction thatmultiple classification
skill should be associated with increased within-group
differentiation in twopossibleways,we examined both
differential evaluations and the absolute difference
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Measures of Group Inclusion and Evaluation as a Function of Group and Type of Member Judged
Group member
In-group Out-group
Normative Deviant Normative Deviant
Inclusion by member’s group 4.58 (0.75) 3.15 (1.53) 4.21 (1.02) 3.68c (1.28)
Inclusion by other group 2.40b (1.41) 3.78c (1.32) 2.28b (1.35) 3.66c (1.21)
Evaluation of member 4.01a (0.88) 3.53b (1.17) 3.23b (1.05) 4.02a (0.70)
Note. Scores may range from 1 to 5. For the inclusion measures, means differ significantly unless they share a subscript (p , .05). For the
evaluation measure, means with different subscripts differ significantly (p , .01).
Table 3
Study 1: Zero-Order Correlations Among Variables
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Age category — — —
2. Intergroup bias 0.78 1.30 .28*** —
3. Differential inclusion 1.19 1.29 .27*** .06
4. Differential evaluation 0.64 1.39 .16* .34*** .34*** —
5. Multiple classification score 1.51 0.81 .38*** .26*** .06 .18* —
6. ToSM score 1.16 0.37 .25** .05 .23** .01 .11
7. Trait attribution 0.26 0.39 .18* .06 .26*** .13 .05 .11
8. Group attribution 0.33 0.39 .20* .01 .14 .02 .16* .07 .20*
9. Loyalty attribution 0.57 0.43 .11 .04 .36*** .10 .07 .09 .27*** .29***
*Note. ToSM 5 theory of social mind.
*p , .05. **p , .01. ***p , .001.
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score between evaluation of deviant and normative
member. Multiple classification skill was associated
with lower rather than higher differential evaluation,
r 5 .16, p , .05, and with lower rather than higher
absolute differentiation between deviant and norma-
tive members, r 5 .20, p , .05. There was no
significant relation between multiple classification
scores and differential inclusion.
To examine the independent roles of age, ToSMand
multiple classification skill in the DSGD model mul-
tiple regression analyses were conducted with these
variables as simultaneous predictors. Intergroup bias
was predicted from both age category, b 5 .23, t 5
2.60, p, .01, and classification skill, b5.19, t5 2.14,
p , .05, but not ToSM, b 5 .05, t 5 .66. Differential
inclusion was significantly predicted by age category,
b5 .28, t5 3.12, p, .01, and ToSM, b 5 .18, t5 2.17,
p, .05, butnotmultiple classification,b5.06, t5 0.71.
None of the variables was a significant independent
predictor of differential evaluation. These analyses
show that intergroup bias reduces as multiple
classification skill and age increase but is unrelated to
ToSM. In contrast, differential inclusion increases as
ToSM performance and age increase but is unrelated to
multiple classificationskill. Figure 2presents theoverall
set of findings summarized in a path analysis showing
statistically independent relationships within the
theoretically specified model.
Attributions. Children offered attributions for how
groups would judge both peer group members. For
each type of attribution (traits, group, and loyalty),
a score was assigned ranging from 0 to 2 (attribution
made for judgments about neither member, one
member, or both members). To determine the inde-
pendent relationship between each type of attribution
with differential inclusion, age category, multiple
classification skill, and ToSM score, these four varia-
bles and the two alternative attributions were re-
gressed onto each attribution score. In line with the
assumptions of the DSGD model, group attributions
and loyalty attributions were each significantly asso-
ciated with differential inclusion, b 5 .23, t 5 3.01,
p , .01, and b 5 .34, t 5 4.87, p , .001, respectively.
No other relationshipswere significant. Thus, children
explaineddifferential inclusion in termsof attributes of
thegroupand issueof loyalty rather than themembers’
personal traits.
A further possibility is that attributions mediate
the relationship between ToSM and differential inclu-
sion. However, inclusion of the three attribution
scores along with ToSM, multiple classification skill
and age as predictors of differential inclusion did not
significantly reduce the effects of ToSM, b 5 .16, p ,
.05, or age, b 5 .21, p , .05.
Discussion
The present study extended previous research by
demonstrating the role social perspective taking abil-
ity may play in children’s exclusion of peers within
intergroup contexts. Another original contribution
was the demonstration that children’s understanding
of group exclusion is related to group and loyalty
attributions. According to the DSGDmodel, differen-
tial inclusion provides an important basis for child-
ren’s exclusion judgments of peers in intergroup
contexts. Consistent with previous evidence (e.g.,
Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003), older children
showed stronger differential inclusion. The overall
pattern of their evaluations of peers was consistent
with the DSGD model and in line with the motiva-
tional hypothesis. Older children who more strongly
favored their in-group over the out-group showed
a stronger relationship between differential inclusion
and differential evaluation (inclusion-related
judgment).
Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Skills
As expected, both ToSMandmultiple classification
skill improvedwith age. However, the focal issues are
whether and how these two skills relate distinctively
to intergroup bias and to differential inclusion. An
important finding was that ToSM performance was
associated only with increased differential inclusion,
whereas multiple classification skill was associated










































6- to 8- Year-Olds 
Figure 1. Study 1: Differential evaluation of normative and deviant
group members as a function of age, intergroup bias, and differen-
tial inclusion.
Note. Values of differential evaluation arederived froma regression
equation inwhich differential evaluation is the dependent variable,
and age category, intergroup bias, differential inclusion, and their
interaction terms are independent variables. Effects of intergroup
bias and differential inclusion are represented by values +/ 1 SD
from their mean.
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An innovation in Study 1 was the use of a false
evaluation task to tap ToSM. In support of the ToSM
hypothesis, children, who performed better on the
ToSM task also used the group memberships’ of
others as a cue to judge how these others would feel
toward deviant and normative members from each
group. The relationship between ToSM and differen-
tial inclusion provides quite clear evidence that
differential inclusion is related to general social
perspective taking ability and not just understanding
about particular group norms. However, in the pres-
ent study, childrenweremembers of one of the groups
and this may have given them a more concrete basis
for inferring differential inclusion. Thus, further evi-
dence is required to show that ToSM performance is
related to general understanding about differential
inclusion even when the child is not directly involved
in the groups. This is one aim of Study 2.
Multiple classification performance was related
negatively to intergroupbias, consistentwith cognitive
developmental theory (e.g., Aboud, 2005, Bigler &
Liben, 2007) and previous DSGD research (Abrams
et al., 2008).However, contrary topredictions,multiple
classification skill was negatively associated with
differential evaluation betweennormative anddeviant
peers. Multiple classification skill was associated with
less differentiation both between andwithin groups. It
seems quite possible that although multiple classifica-
tion skill does indeed attenuate dependence on simple
intercategory distinctions, it does not enhance the use
of within-category differences. This seems a worth-
while avenue for future research as it may relate to the
relative salience of different levels of categorization in
particular situations (Bigler & Liben, 2007).
Newevidence inStudy 1 revealed that childrenwho
expected higher levels of differential inclusion were
also more likely to explain inclusion and exclusion in
terms of the loyalty of the members and the properties
of the groups as a whole but did not make greater
reference to the personal traits of the deviant or
normative peers. This shows that when childrenmade
distinctions among peers within the groups, they used
group-relevant dimensions or criteria for drawing
those distinctions, rather than treating each child as
a unique individual. This result is compatible with
research showing that as they get older, children are
more likely to use ‘‘group functioning’’ justifications in
their explanations for social exclusion within-group
settings (Killen et al., 2002). The attribution findings are
also consistent with those of Spears Brown and Bigler
(2004) who found an age trend in use of attributions to
discrimination. In the present study, older children
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Figure 2. Study 1: Path diagram of the effects of age category, social-cognitive abilities, and intergroup bias on differential inclusion and
differential evaluation.
Note. Pathweights are standardized regression coefficients. Italicized coefficientswithin boxes are theR2 for the relevant dependent variable.
All paths are significant.
*p, .05. **p, .01. ***p, .001. All effect sizes derived fromR2 (Cohen&Cohen, 1983, p. 116) are eithermedium (f 2. .09) or large (f 2. .25).
TheR2 statistics increase bynotmore than 0.02 for any of the dependent variableswhen all other potential predictor variables are added to the
equations.
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Intergroup Bias
The present evidence lends further support to the
robustness of the DSGD model by showing that the
same subjective group dynamics operate in different
intergroup relationships (i.e., English –German,
English – French). Abrams, Rutland, and Cameron
(2003) observed age-related increases in intergroup
bias against supporters of the German soccer team,
whereas Study 1 showed age-related decrease in bias
against the French. These different age trends may be
explained in terms of older children’s greater sensi-
tivity to wider social norms (Abrams et al., 2007;
Nesdale et al., 2005; Rutland, 1999, 2004; Rutland
et al., 2005). Specifically, age variations in intergroup
bias during middle childhood may depend upon the
internalization of perceived social norms regarding
the appropriateness of expressing bias against a par-
ticular group (cf. Crandall, Eshelmann, & O’Brien,
2002). Previous developmental research revealed that
English children express stronger bias against
Germans than against the French (see Barrett, 2005;
Rutland, 1999; Rutland et al., 2005), perhaps reflecting
the different historical relationships among these
countries and the major role of teaching about the
First and Second World War in the National Curric-
ulum for schools in England. Perhaps, therefore it is
not surprising that as children get older, they express
relatively more bias against the Germans and less
against the French. Significantly, the present findings
illustrate that the motivational connection between
intergroup bias, differential inclusion, and differen-
tial evaluation strengthens with age regardless of the
overall trend of intergroup bias with age (Abrams,
Rutland, & Cameron, 2003).
Study 2
The finding that age is related to differential inclusion
over and above the relation between ToSM and
differential inclusion suggests there is a role for
additional developmental influences on children
understanding of group dynamics and exclusion of
peers within groups. In particular, generalizing from
peer relationships within social groups may be
another contributing factor in any multifaceted
account of children’s exclusion judgments and rea-
soning. Children develop friendships and begin to
interactwithin peer groups duringmiddle childhood,
for example, within schools and clubs (Brown, 1990;
Dunn, 2004; Erwin, 1993; Hartup, 1983; Howes, 1996).
In this peer context, they presumably learn the
ground rules of group behavior that can be extrapo-
lated to new situations. Bigler and Liben (2007) also
propose that children ‘‘infer from environmental data
which bases of classifications are important within
a given context’’ (p. 163) and that ‘‘the degree andway
in which categorization processes operate will be
affected by the individual child’s classification skill
(which undergoes age-related change) and environ-
mental experience (e.g., the number of encounters
with exemplars)’’ (p. 164). Consistent with this rea-
soning, we contend that children with more experi-
ence of peer groupmembership (i.e., more exemplars)
are likely to make more group-related inferences
about inclusion and exclusion.
In light of these considerations, Study 2 was
designed to investigate how classification and
social-cognitive skills and experience of peer group
relations are related to children’s general expectations
about relationships between andwithin social groups
(Abrams et al., 2005).
Study 2 addressed three new questions. The first
was to examine how performance on the ToSM task is
related to children’s group norm understanding, that is,
their general expectations that in intergroup compet-
itions, peer group members will show differential
inclusion of loyal in-group and disloyal out-group
members. Importantly, the measure of group norm
understanding in Study 2 is unconfounded with
direct experience or membership of the groups.
Participants were not themselves a member of the
groups, which were entirely meaningless other than
being defined by different colors. The group norm
understanding measure is analogous to the differen-
tial inclusionmeasures in previous studies (including
Study 1) but requires children to make inferences
merely from the membership and loyalty of the
members.
Study 1 showed children’s social perspective tak-
ing (ToSM) is related to understanding of group
dynamics. In Study 2, we hypothesize that there
should also be a positive relationship between ToSM
performance and group norm understanding. As
group norm understanding has never beenmeasured
in previous DSGD research, confirmation of this
hypothesis would advance a core assumption in the
DSGD model and generalize the findings from
Study 1.
The second aim was to examine whether group
norm understanding is associated with experience of
peer relationswithin social groups. Specifically, Study
2 asked children to list the different groups to which
they belonged. It was hypothesized that childrenwho
belonged to a larger number of different groups should
have awider experience of typical peer groupprocesses
(e.g., pressures to conform to group expectations
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and the need to act in away that validates groupnorms)
and therefore should have better generic group norm
understanding. Confirmation of this hypothesis would
support the idea that experience of peer relationswithin
groups is implicated in childrenunderstandingof social
exclusion within intergroup contexts. A further possi-
bility is that belonging to more groups might provide
children with more opportunities to observe multiple
perspectives, and may therefore be related to social
perspective taking skill, reflected by higher ToSM
scores.
Finally, Study 2 provided a further opportunity to
test whether multiple classification skill is related to
differential inclusion independently of age. Based on
previous evidence and findings from Study 1, it is
expected that although older children should have
better multiple classification skills, ToSM, and group
norm understanding, multiple classification skill
should be unrelated to ToSM or group norm under-
standing. This study also provided an opportunity to
probemeasurement properties of the shape and color
multiple classification measure used in Study 1 and




One hundred and forty-nine children (67 male and
82 female) aged between 5 and 11 years (M 5 94.7
months) from the same background population as
those in Study 1 were interviewed individually by
a female or male experimenter. The children were
presented with four multiple classification tasks
(shapes, lines, animals, and humans) and were asked
to explain their solution to the task for the last of these
(humans). They also completed the ToSM task from
Study 1 and a group norm understanding task. The
order of the different tasks was counterbalanced.
Finally, children were asked to list as many groups
they belong to as they could think of. There were no
significant effects of order on the mean scores and no
effects of participant gender or experimenter gender.
Therefore, order and gender are not considered
further.
Group Norm Understanding
This task involved two components. The first mea-
sured whether children understood that teams tend to
show in-groupbias in favor of their ownmembers. The
task described two teams, labeled and colored ‘‘Red’’
and ‘‘Green,’’ respectively. Two circles with smiley
faces also represented their respective members LC
(colored red) and JR (colored green). Children were
told, ‘‘A group of children are all doing a treasure hunt.
There are two teams playing against each other. Each
teamhas towork separately to find clues to find the big
prize—whichever team finds the big prize will win.
There is a RED team and a GREEN team. LC is on the
red team. JR is on the green team.Whodoyou think the
RED team likes more? (tick one).’’
The responses were made by presenting three call
out boxes. The first included a red smiley face that
stated ‘‘I think the RED team would like LC more.’’
The second included a green smiley face and stated
‘‘I think the RED teamwould like JR more.’’ The third
had no smiley face but stated ‘‘I think the RED team
would like LC and JR the same amount.’’ A follow-up
question asked ‘‘Why do you think the RED team
would think like that?’’
Because no children chose ‘‘both,’’ answers were
scored as 0 if the child chose JR (an opposite team
member), 1 if the child chose LC (a same team
member), and 2 if the child chose LC and accompa-
nied the answer with an explanation that involved
group membership (e.g., ‘‘because LC is on the same
team’’).
The second part of the task was designed to see
whether children would anticipate differential evalu-
ation. The task stated, ‘‘We asked LC and JR to tell
everyonewhat they thought about their teams and this
is what they said.’’ Next to the picture of LCwas a call
out box with the statement, ‘‘I like my team, the RED
team, but I hope that the GREEN team wins the big
prize.’’ There was also a picture of JR with the
statement, ‘‘I like my team, the GREEN team, but I
hope theRED teamwins the big prize.’’We then asked,
‘‘Based on what LC and JR said about the teams, who
do you think the RED team likes more? (tick one).’’
The response options were the same as in the first
stage of the task. Answers were scored as 0 if the child
chose LC, 1 if the child either chose JR, or chose ‘‘both’’
but explained the answer in terms of support for the
Red group, and 2 if the child chose only JR and
explained the answer in terms of support.
These two scores were combined to provide amean
group norm understanding score. Obviously, there
couldbemanyreasonswhyagroupprefersaparticular
member. However, the aim of the task, and scoring
scheme, was to focus on the specific issue of whether
children would anticipate that groups favor in-group
members in general, and in-group-supporting indi-
viduals from an out-group in particular. Therefore, the
task and scoring represent an analog of the differential
inclusion measure used in Study 1 but without the
complication of the participant being a member of one
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of the groups and without the complication of using
real groups.
Multiple Classification
Children completed the task with red and green
triangles andXs as in Study 1. The additionalmultiple
classification tasks are detailed in the Appendix.
Results and Discussion
Group Memberships
Children mentioned a very wide range of groups
(mostly in a school context) that all involved interac-
tion with peers and other children in a group setting.
The groups listed included: after school club, ski club,
skipping, tennis, cheerleaders, yellow group, blue
group, computer club, tsullido, art club jujitsu club,
French club, drama club, beavers, pony club, rounders
(similar to baseball) team, buddy class, sports day
team, youth club, trampoline club, gardening club,
breakfast club, team3, football, reading group major-
ettes, dancing club, cricket club, Thursday club, boxing
class, judo club, band, scouts, rugby club, house team,
netball team, singing group, athletics club, brownies,
butterflies, gymnastics, ballet, and swimming club. For
example, there were 47mentions of team sport groups
(e.g., hockey team, soccer team), 22 mentions of
musical or arts ensemble groups (e.g., choir, art clubs),
and so on. Thirty-eight children did not mention any
group. Sixty-eight children mentioned one type of
group, 31 mentioned two different types of group, 10
mentioned three different types of group, and 2
mentioned four different types of group. Further de-
tails of the groups listed are available on request.
Predictors of Group Norm Understanding
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among
variables are shown in Table 4, which shows, consis-
tent with Study 1, that age is significantly positively
correlatedwith bothmultiple classification and ToSM
performance. More importantly, ToSM performance
was significantly related to group norm understand-
ing. This is in line with the finding from Study 1 that
ToSM was significantly related to differential inclu-
sion. In addition, consistent with our expectations
about the contributing role of peer group experience,
number of group memberships was significantly
positively associated with group norm understand-
ing and ToSM scores.
We assume that the group memberships measure
provides a relatively direct index of the breadth of
children’s experience of peer dynamics within
groups. Other inputs from the social environment
as well as cognitive development may be correlated
with age. Importantly, age and group memberships
were unrelated, and hence, we could assess the
independent contribution of each as predictors of
multiple classification, ToSM, and group norm
understanding.
Regression analyses showed that multiple classifi-
cation performancewas significantly predicted by age,
b 5 .17, t5 2.11, p, .05, but not group memberships,
b5 .04, t5 0.45, overall R25 .031. ToSM performance
was significantly predicted by both age, b 5 .20, t 5
2.61, p5 .01, and groupmemberships, b5 .30, t5 3.81,
p, .001, overall R25 .13. Group norm understanding
was also significantly predicted by age, b 5 .32, t 5
4.18, p 5 .001, and group memberships, b 5 .19, t 5
2.44, p , .05, overall R2 5 .14.
Given that age and multiple classification were
positively correlated (as in Study 1), and that both
were significantly correlated with ToSM, regression
analysis was used to establish whether multiple
classification performance was related to ToSM inde-
pendently of age. This analysis revealed that ToSM
was significantly associatedwith age, b5 .18, t5 2.15,
p , .05, but not with multiple classification perfor-
mance, overall R2 5 .06, consistent with findings in
Study 1.
Table 4
Study 2: Zero-Order Correlations Among Variables







Age in months 61 – 130 94.47 (21.6)
Number of group memberships 0 – 5 1.29 (1.02) .000
Multiple classification 0 – 2 1.71 (0.60) .17* .04
Theory of social mind 0 – 2 1.07 (0.54) .20* .30*** .20*
Group norm understanding 0 – 4 1.65 (1.38) .32*** .19* .10 .22**
*p , .05. **p , .01. ***p , .001.
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Mediation analysis. Finally, given that both age and
group memberships were independently associated
with ToSM and that both variables also indepen-
dently predicted group norm understanding the con-
ditions were fulfilled statistically to test for the idea
that ToSMmaymediate the relationships between age
and group norm understanding and/or between
groupmemberships and group norm understanding.
The results of these analyses are depicted in Figure 3,
showing standardized regression coefficients among
the variables. When ToSM is included in the regres-
sion analysis, the relationship between age and group
normunderstanding remains significant, whereas the
relationship between group memberships and group
norm understanding relationship is reduced to non-
significance. Following the method advocated by
Baron and Kenny (1986), a Sobel test revealed mar-
ginalmediation of ToSM for groupmemberships,Z5
1.89, p5 .059. A statistical possibility, though not one
that we would predict, is that of reverse mediation,
that is, that group norm understanding mediates
between group memberships and ToSM skill. How-
ever, the standardized coefficient for the effect of
group memberships on ToSM only reduced from .30
to .26 when group norm understanding was in the
regression analysis and there was little indication of
mediation, Z 5 1.59, p 5 .11.
In summary, older children and those who report
more group memberships have better ToSM skill
and also better group norm understanding. Children
with better ToSM skill have better group norm under-
standing, and ToSM may partially mediate the rela-
tion between group memberships and group norm
understanding.
Taken together, the results of Study 2 extend and
provide important convergent support for the inter-
pretation of results from Study 1. First, as hypothe-
sized, ToSMwas associated with generic group norm
understanding. Second, as hypothesized, experience
of peer relations in social groups, both indirectly
through age and directly through membership of
social groups, was associated with generic group
norm understanding. In addition, ToSM and peer
group experience were positively related, suggesting
that such experience may contribute to ToSM skill as
well as directly contributing to group norm under-
standing. Third, the studyverified that the shapes and
colors multiple classification task taps skill that gen-
eralizes to different types of category content and
supported the hypothesis that multiple classification
skill is related to age but not to group norm under-
standing. There was no relation between multiple
classification performance and number of group
memberships, suggesting that age-related develop-
ment of multiple classification skill may be indepen-
dent of peer group experience.
General Discussion
The present research provides the first evidence that
second-order mental state understanding, measured
with the ToSM task, is related to children’s perceptions
of group dynamics. Across both studies, social per-
spective taking was related to children’s understand-
ing of inclusion and exclusion of particular group
members. The importance of this ‘‘group nous’’—an
implicit understanding of normative processes within
and between groups—is demonstrated by the positive
relationship between social perspective taking (ToSM)
and understanding of social exclusion both in the case
of a context-specific real competitive intergroup rela-
tionship between England and France (differential
inclusion in Study 1) and a more abstract imaginary
competitive intergroup relationship (group norm
understanding in Study 2).
Study 1 also provided important convergent vali-
dation for the assumption that differential inclusion is
associated with explanations (attributions) that are
specifically concerned with group function. Study 2
showed the distinctive character of group nous by
demonstrating for the first time that group norm
understanding is associated with relevant experience
of peer relations through memberships of social
groups. Evidence across the studies consolidates the
conclusion that although multiple classification skill
improves with age and may be related to lower
intergroup bias, it is not inevitably related to differ-
ential inclusion and exclusion of peers within groups.
The findings illustrate the value of examining
processes that might lay the foundations for social
psychological phenomena in adults. Older children’s















Figure 3. Study 2: Path diagram of the effects of age and group
memberships on theory of social mind and group norm under-
standing.
Note. Path weights are standardized regression coefficients. Itali-
cized coefficientswithin boxes are theR2 for the relevant dependent
variable. All paths are significant.
*p , .05. **p , .01. ***p , .001. Coefficients in parentheses are
direct effects after ToSM is accounted for.
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beyond a shift from group-based to individual-based
or multiple-category-based judgment (cf. Aboud,
1988; Brewer, 1988). Children with more advanced
social perspective taking ability and with greater
experience of peer relations within groups also inte-
grate information about group and individual char-
acteristics so that others are judged in the context of
their group membership and the relationship
between groups. This integrative process seems con-
sistent with current research suggesting that adults’
use multiple levels of categorization flexibly and
strategically to sustain a distinctive identity (cf.
Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Marques et al., 1998).
Implications and Future Directions
The present findings suggest an alternative conclu-
sion to evidence that peer victimizers (e.g., children
who derogate a deviant) necessarily have poor social-
cognitive skills (Crick & Dodge, 1994; McKeough,
Yates, &Marini, 1994). Itmaybe that ‘‘effective’’ bullies
are children with more group nous. If they care about
their group membership, such children can use their
understanding of the group dynamics in intergroup
contexts strategically to derogate or upgrade particular
peers in away that bolsters their in-group. Thus, social
perspective taking skill may facilitate older children’s
avoidance and engagement in indirect methods of
bullying such as social exclusion within a peer group
(Bjorkqvist, Lagerspetz, & Kaukainen, 1992; Emler &
Reicher, 1995; Rivers & Smith, 1994).
The present research investigated the DSGDmodel
in the context of intergroup competition. With adults
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and children (Nesdale et al.,
2005), intergroup competition, high status, and threat
from out-groups can all increase levels of intergroup
bias. Intergroup competition also increases subjective
groupdynamics effects in adults (Marques,Abrams,&
Seroˆdio, 2001). Thus, it would be useful for future
research to investigatewhether children’s sensitivity to
variations in competition, status, and threat affects
support for the DSGD model and it would provide
a valuable link with research in Nesdale’s (2004) social
identity development theory (cf. Bennett & Sani, 2004).
In Study 1, group members in the scenarios were
always male. Consistent with Abrams, Rutland, and
Cameron’s (2003) results, there was no evidence that
boys engagedwith the taskmore than girls. It remains
to be discovered whether comparable results will be
obtained if the context involves female group mem-
bers in a women’s sports competition. It would be
useful to investigate whether the DSGD model is
supported equally in the case of ethnic, religious,
and other intergroup axes (Abrams et al., 2005, 2008)
and also when there are strong differences in terms of
stereotypes or values rather than direct competition
between groups. Children also formpeer networks, of
cliques, in middle childhood (Brown, 1990) and it
would be interesting to examine whether the group
influence processes evident in the DSGD model
operate in these spontaneously formed social rela-
tionship groups (Ellis & Zarbatany, 2007).
Given the DSGD model’s emphasis on children’s
understanding about social and situational norms,
a fruitful line of investigation would bewhether there
are cultural differences or similarities in the treatment
of deviant groupmembers (see alsoMcAuliffe, Jetten,
Hornsey, & Hogg, 2003; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, &
Coon, 2002). Evidence of variations and stability
across culture and intergroup context would suggest
that subjective group dynamics may affect some
domains of social inclusion and exclusion, such as
social-conventional justifications, but not others, such
as moral justifications (Abrams & Rutland, 2008;
Abrams et al., 2008; cf. Killen, Crystal, & Watanabe,
2002; Killen, Lee-Kim, et al., 2002).
Finally, while we have made substantial progress
in testing the DSGD model, there remain numerous
important avenues to explore. We have examined age
differences in subjective group dynamics and it
would now be useful to track the codevelopment of
social perspective taking and group norm under-
standing longitudinally to gain further insight into
the developmental course of these processes. In
addition, it would be useful to investigate exactly
how children relate their personal experiences of
groups to their general expectations about group
dynamics. Based on our theorizing, we would expect
older children to have more coherent and explicit
theories about group dynamics and to have a clearer
appreciation that identification with groups, both for
themselves and others, implies greater commitment,
loyalty, and group-serving judgments of peers.
Conclusions
These findings provide important new evidence
that children’s social perspective taking andexperience
of peer relations within groups may contribute to their
understanding of groupdynamics and social exclusion
within peer groups. They illuminate how and why
social-cognitive skills and group processes may com-
bine to affect peer exclusion (cf. Rutland, Abrams, &
Levy, 2007). The evidence adds several pillars support-
ing theDSGDmodel. Two types of ability contribute to
the DSGD in different ways. Consistent with cognitive
developmental theory (Aboud, 2005; Bigler & Liben,
2007), multiple classification skill is related to
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a decrease intergroup bias. However, at the same
time, it appears that increased ToSM ability is related
to differentiation between and exclusion of peers
within groups in terms of their fit to the group norms.
Thus, even if older children show less direct inter-
group bias, they seem to be more sophisticated in
targeting their positive evaluations at peers who
support their in-group.
Experience of peer relations within groups, gained
as a result of membership of a larger number of social
groups, also contributes to children’s understanding of
group and intergroup dynamics. This group nousmay
be an important aspect of children’s developing ability
to navigate social relationships involving groups. In
some circumstances, this may enable them to be or to
evade bullies who exclude other children that contra-
vene prescriptive group norms. Given the substantial
influence that group processes and norms can have
among adults, it is understandable that group nous
is an important social survival skill that children begin
to develop in middle childhood. Future research is
required to explore further how children learn and
apply their group nous to exclusion and inclusion of
peers across different kinds of group contexts.
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Appendix: Measurement of Multiple
Classification Skill
Study 2 also examined whether performance on the
colors and shapes task is reliably associated with
performance on related measures employing other
more social classification dimensions (e.g., Aboud,
2005; Bigler & Liben, 1992). It also examined whether
the simple scoring scheme for multiple classification
used in Study 1 yielded results comparable to those
when justifications for classification are also scored
(Bigler & Liben, 1992). Therefore, three additional
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classification tasks were included, the last of which
required children to explain their sorting strategy.
After the colors and shapes task, children com-
pleted the task with lines that were either straight or
wavy and were either short or long. Next, they
completed the taskwith pictures of elephants or bears
that were either gray or brown (as in Bigler & Liben,
1992), and finally with people who were either male
or female and adults or children.All taskswere scored
using the 0 – 2 scale used previously. At the end of the
people sorting task, children were asked why they
had put people in the particular boxes they had
selected. Answers were coded using amore extended
scheme such that 0 was assigned if no reason was
offered, 1 if neither age or gender was used, 2 if only
one of these categories was used, 3 if both were used,
and 4 if the justification referred to equal distribution
of both categories (e.g., ‘‘some are men, some are
women, and some are adults and some are children’’).
Performance differed on the four tasks, F(3, 144)5
54.18, p, .005, g2p 5 :53. Children performed equally
on the shapes task (M 5 1.71, SD 5 .60) and animals
tasks (M 5 1.71, SD 5 .63), less well on the lines task
(M5 1.55, SD5 .68, p, .01), and lesswell than that on
the people task (M 5 0.72, SD 5 .88, p , .001).
These differences may reflect the complexity of the
stimulus sets. In the shapes task and the animals task,
no stimuli that could fall outside the two focal
dimensions so children could either distribute the
stimuli randomly or use one or both dimensions
systematically. However, on the lines task and hu-
mans task, the stimuli also varied in other respects
that were uncorrelated with the focal dimensions.
Children occasionally used some of these other fea-
tures for grouping, such as the angle of the lines, or
idiosyncratic features such as hairstyle that were
uncorrelated with the focal dimensions and did not
provide a parsimonious basis for categorization.
Factor analysis of scores on the four multiple
classification tasks revealed that they all loaded on
only a single factor, accounting for 57.1% of the
variance.All loadingswere over 0.4. The classification
score for the human categories and the coded explan-
ations for the answers to that task were highly
significantly related, r5 .78, p, .001. Moreover, both
were correlated with a combined index of all four
tasks, rs 5 .94 and .94, respectively.
These results are consistent with the idea that the
shape and color classification task used in our pre-
vious research and in Study 1 and Study 2 taps the
same ability as othermultiple classification tasks, and
the scoring system for that task captures much of the
same variance as a scoring system based on explan-
ations. Abrams et al. (2007) also showed that the
correlation between shapes and colors classification
and age was the same regardless of whether a simple
or an explanation-based coding scheme was used.
Data from the shapes and colors task are reported in
the main text to maintain comparability with Study 1
and Abrams et al. (2007, 2008).
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